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We analyze the choice of exchange rate regimes of the 25 transition economies in 
Europe and the CIS after 1990. The empirical results show that the traditional 
Optimum Currency Area considerations provide relevant guidance for the exchange 
rate regime choices in these countries. Moreover, regime choices are influenced by 
inflation rates, cumulative inflation differentials, and the availability of international 
reserves. That is, macroeconomic stabilization and the ability to commit to a credible 
exchange rate peg play important roles in the determination of exchange rate regime 
choices. Large government deficits have ambiguous effects; they increase the 
likelihood of moving from a flexible exchange rate to an intermediate peg as well as 
the likelihood of moving from a fixed to an intermediate peg. 
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1. Introduction 
What is the appropriate exchange rate regime for an economy? Over the past 40 
years, economists have developed various answers to this question. Early literature, 
based on the seminal work on optimal currency areas (OCA) by Mundell, Kenen, and 
McKinnon, stressed fundamentals related to the ability to cope with demand shocks 
and the usefulness of monetary policy for aggregate demand management. 
Subsequent authors writing in the tradition of Poole's (1970) analysis of monetary 
policy instruments focused on the type and source of the dominant shocks to which 
an economy is exposed. Building on Barro and Gordon's (1983) work on monetary 
policy credibility, the literature of the 1980s developed the idea that exchange rate 
pegs could help import credibility of low inflation policies from a foreign central bank 
(e.g. Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) and von Hagen (1991)), a popular justification 
for Italian and French membership in the European Monetary System. Most recent 
literature, finally, notes that the currency crises of the 1990s (Mexico, South-East 
Asia, Russia, Brazil, and Argentina) involved combinations of some form of exchange 
rate pegging with high capital mobility. It concludes that countries exposed to large 
capital flows must avoid unstable exchange rate regimes and are left with two corner 
solutions: a very hard currency peg (such as a currency board or dollarization) or 
flexible exchange rates, a view that has been dubbed the “hollow-out” hypothesis.
1  
The collapse of the Bretton Woods System in the early 1970s set the stage 
for more diversified choices of exchange rate regimes and brought in a strand of 
empirical literature to explain these choices.
2 The early empirical literature 
addressing this issue found that the fundamentals identified by the OCA approach 
provided some guidance for observed regime choices (Heller (1978) and Dreyer 
(1978)). Later studies introduced considerations of optimal macroeconomic 
stabilization, adding proxies for various types of shocks (Melvin (1985) and Savvides 
(1990, 1993)). These authors find that the presence of domestic nominal shocks 
raises the likelihood of a currency peg, while real shocks reduce it. More recent 
empirical literature considers the influence of political and institutional variables on 
regime choices and suggests that political instability tends to increase the likelihood 
of flexible exchange rate regimes (Edwards (1996) and Berger et al. (2000)). 
The purpose of this paper is to develop an empirical model of exchange rate 
regime choice for a group of 25 transition economies in the 1990s. This is an 
interesting sample, because, not withstanding their economic heterogeneity, these 
                                                  
1 See Eichengreen (1994), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), and Fischer (2001). 
2 See, among others, Heller (1978), Holden et al. (1979), Dreyer (1978), Melvin (1985), 
Savvides (1990), Edwards (1996), Bernhard and Leblang (1999), and Poirson (2001).  2
countries share a common history of emerging from socialist regimes largely isolated 
from the world economy at the end of the 1980s, they all faced large macro economic 
imbalances and stabilization problems initially, they all became gradually integrated 
into international trade and financial markets during the period we consider. Yet, 
there is quite a variety of exchange rate regimes among these countries. The main 
question of this paper is, how this variety can be explained. 
In section 2, we describe the evolution of exchange rate regimes in our 
sample group. In section 3, we summarize the main arguments for regime choice in 
the literature. Section 4 develops empirical models of exchange rate regime choice 
and present estimates of this model. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition Countries 
2.1.  Exchange Rate Regime Classification 
Member countries of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) declare their exchange 
rate regimes to the Fund, which reports these regimes annually. Before 1999, 
countries could declare one of three possible regimes: pegged arrangements, more 
flexible arrangements, and free floats.
3 This coarse classification was refined in 1999 
responding to the observation of a considerable degree of variation in the official 
descriptions of the policies classified as “pegged” or “more flexible”. The IMF's (1999) 
classification of exchange rate regimes allows for eight different categories ranging 
from the adoption of a foreign currency as legal tender to free floats. Table 1 below 
presents an overview. Our empirical work below applies this classification to the 25 
countries in our sample. Since the IMF presents this new scheme only starting in 
1997, we used the criteria given in IMF (1999) to reconstruct the classification for our 
sample countries prior to 1997. Thus, our classification of exchange rate regimes 
starts in 1990. 
Several recent empirical studies of exchange rate policies point out that 
adjustments in the central parities and foreign exchange market interventions can 
produce considerable differences between the official regime and the de-facto regime 
adopted by a country (Calvo and Reinhard (2000), Gosh et al. (1997), and Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000)). This does not imply, however, that official regimes 
are irrelevant. Even if they do not always coincide with de-facto regimes, official 
regimes are likely to guide financial market expectations about exchange rate 
developments and affect international financial policy decisions. The existing 
                                                  
3 The fourth category, “regimes with limited flexibility” was a special one for members of the 
European Monetary System and the four members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. For the 
countries in our sample, it was irrelevant.   3
literature on regime choices has usually focused on the official ones published by the 
IMF.
4  In this paper, we follow this approach. 
 
Table 1: Exchange Rate Regimes: The IMF's Classification System 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Exchange Rate Regime    Descriptions 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1  Dollarization, euroization  No separate legal tender 
2  Currency Board    Currency fully backed by foreign exchange reserves 
3  Conventional Fixed Pegs  Peg to another currency or currency basket within 
a band of at most +/- 1% 
4  Horizontal Bands    Pegs with bands larger than +/- 1% 
5  Crawling Pegs    Pegs with central parity periodically adjusted in 
fixed amounts at a pre-announced rate or in response 
to changes in selected quantitative indicators 
6  Crawling Bands    Crawling pegs combined with bands larger than +/- 1%  
7  Managed Float with No  Active intervention without precommitment 
    Preannounced Path for  to a preannounced target or path for the 
    the Exchange Rate   exchange rate 
8  Independent Float    Market-determined exchange rate with monetary 
policy independent of exchange rate policy 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: IMF (1999) 
 
2.2.  Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition Economies 
Appendix II records the choices of exchange rate regimes adopted in the transition 
economies from 1990 through the end of 1999. The exchange rate regime choices 
are those observed at the end of each year. The entries in Appendix II correspond to 
the numbers given to the individual regimes in Table 1. While all countries in the 
sample started with a conventional peg, eleven countries were classified as having 
adopted free floats and three were following managed floats in 1994. There were 
then two countries with currency board arrangements and seven that were applying a 
conventional peg. In 1996, the number of free floaters was eight, while six countries 
had adopted a managed float. The number of countries with currency boards was still 
two, and there were just two other countries that had adopted conventional pegs. In  
1999, there were six free floaters left, and eleven countries had turned to managed 
floats. The number of currency board arrangements had increased to three, and the 
number of conventional pegs was three, too. It is clear from this table that the 
exchange rate regimes adopted in transition economies are very diversified. Only 
                                                  
4 An early exception is Holden et al. (1979), who construct an index for exchange rate 
flexibility. Poirson (2001) also uses a similar flexibility index as the dependent variable in one 
specification of the empirical model for regime choices. The other specifications all involve 
discrete dependent variables based on the IMF classification.  4
Estonia and Slovenia did not change their exchange rate regimes at all during the 
period from 1991 to 1999. 
 
Table 2: Distributions of Exchange Rate Regimes (in percent) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1991—1993 1994—1996 1997--1999 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All Countries 
Pegged Regimes    45,5    25,3       25,3 
Intermediate Regimes    5,5        17,3       16,0 
Floating Regimes         49,1       57,3      58,7 
EU Candidates
1 
Pegged Regimes            36,0       46,7       40,4 
Intermediate Regimes     12,0       23,3       23,3 
Floating Regimes         52,0       30,0       36,7 
Other Countries
2 
Pegged Regimes           53,3       11,1       15,6 
Intermediate Regimes     0,0        13,3       11,1 
Floating Regimes         46,7       75,6       73,3 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Appendix II. 
[1] Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. 
[2] Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and the CIS members (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). 
 
For a more systematic presentation, and because the full classification would 
leave us with too few observations in some cases for the empirical analysis intended 
below, we group our regimes in three categories: “pegged regimes” include the IMF 
classifications 1-3, “intermediate regimes” classifications 4-6, and “floating regimes” 
classifications 7 and 8. Table 2 shows the resulting distribution of exchange rate 
regimes in three different sub-periods based on the number of country-year 
observations in each period considered. Among all transition countries, roughly half 
adopted a floating rate in the early 1990s. This share was relatively stable and 
reached 59 percent at the end of the decade. In contrast, the share of pegged 
regimes fell substantially, from 45 percent to 25 percent, which made room for the 
increase in the share of intermediate regimes. 
There are visible differences between the European Union (EU) accession 
candidates and other transition countries. The share of pegs increased from 36 
percent to 40 percent among the former, while the share of floats declined from 52 to 
37 percent. In contrast, more than 70 percent of the other transition economies finally 
chose a floating regime. The tendency to adopt “corner solutions” is less prevalent 
among the EU accession candidates.  5
Table 3 has more information about the changes in exchange rate regimes 
during the 1990s. Column (I) reports the cumulative change in exchange rate 
regimes for each country, while Column (II) reports the number of regime changes. 
The average absolute regime changes are listed in Column (III). For Column (I), a 
large positive number means that a country moved to a much more flexible exchange 
rate regime, while a large negative number indicates that a country tightened its 
regime. The table indicates that regime choices changed quite frequently during the 
1990s. Some countries moved consistently in the same direction, while others moved 
from less to more flexible regimes and then reversed their choices later. An important 
implication of this is that the practice of earlier studies of exchange rate regime 
choices of using data averaged or lagged over several years to explain regime 
choices can be misleading, as regime choices have changed frequently and, 
probably, responding to changing economic circumstances. In the empirical work 
below, therefore, we explain annual exchange rate regime choices over the decade 
under consideration. 
 
Table 3: Changes in Exchange Rate Regimes: 1990-1999 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
EU  Candidates    (I)   (II)   (III)   Other Countries   (I)   (II)   (III) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CEEC
1           Albania        5     1     5 
Bulgaria       -1    2     5.5       Croatia        4     3     4 
Czech Rep.     4     2     2          Macedonia      -5    1     5 
Hungary        3     1     3        Armenia        5     1     5 
Poland         3     2     1.5     Azerbaijan     4     2     3 
Romania        4     3     2       Belarus        4     3     3.3 
Slovak Rep.    4    2     2          Georgia        5     4     3.8 
Slovenia       0     0     0          Kazakhstan     5     3     2.3 
                                    Kyrgyz Rep.    4     2     3 
Baltics                               Moldova        5     1     5 
Estonia        0     0     0          Russia         0     4     2 
Latvia         -5    1     5          Tajikistan     4     2     3 
Lithuania      -6    1     6          Turkmenistan     0     2     4 
                                       Ukraine        -1    3     2.3 
                                       Uzbekistan     4     2     3 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Appendix II. 
Note: Column (I): cumulative changes in exchange rate regimes. Column (II): 
number of changes in exchange rate regimes. Column (III): average absolute 
changes in exchange rate regimes. 




3.  Determinants of Exchange Rate Regime Choice 
3.1.  Theories and Hypotheses 
We distinguish between three groups of factors affecting a country's exchange rate 
regime choice: Economic fundamentals, variables relating to macroeconomic 
stabilization, and variables relating to the risk of currency crises. Building on 
Mundell's (1961) work, McKinnon (1963) points to economic size and openness as 
important fundamentals. He argues that small and open economies are more likely to 
adopt fixed exchange rate regimes than large and relatively closed economies. 
Furthermore, a country is more likely to adopt a fixed exchange rate regime, if its 
trade is heavily concentrated on a particular currency area. Next, Kenen (1969) 
suggests that countries with very concentrated production structures are more likely 
to adopt flexible exchange rates than countries with highly diversified production, as  
exchange rate changes are almost equivalent to changes in the relative output prices 
and are, therefore, more useful to cope with demand shocks for the former.  A final 
consideration is the development of a country's financial sector. Countries with 
relatively undeveloped financial sectors often opt for fixed exchange rate regimes, 
because they lack the market instruments to conduct domestic open market 
operations and because they wish to shield their fledgling banking industries against 
large exchange rate movements. Thus, low financial development should increase 
the probability of adopting fixed exchange rates. 
Following Poole's (1970) analysis of the optimal monetary policy instrument, 
Henderson (1979), McKinnon (1981), and Boyer (1978) argue that fixed exchange 
rates perform better in terms of output stability in the presence of monetary shocks 
originating in the domestic economy, while flexible rates perform better in the 
presence of real shocks. This suggests that countries exposed to large supply-side 
shocks should opt for flexible exchange rates, while countries suffering from large 
monetary and financial market disturbances should peg their exchange rates. 
Models in the tradition of the monetary approach to exchange rate 
determination, in contrast, focus on the transmission of inflation between countries 
and the use of exchange rate policies to achieve low inflation rates. Following Barro 
and Gordon (1983), numerous authors have argued that countries whose monetary 
authorities suffer from low credibility of low-inflation policies can import central bank 
credibility by adopting a fixed exchange rate with a more stable currency (e.g., 
Fratianni and von Hagen (1992), Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989), and Melitz (1988)). 
This view was particularly important in the early years of the transition from a socialist 
to a market economy, when price liberalization and the destruction of monetary 
overhangs inherited from past led to high inflation. For the initial macro economic  7
stabilization, a fixed exchange rate could provide a nominal anchor for domestic 
prices in a situation where no credible domestic monetary institutions existed. Even 
for transition countries that started transition with more moderate inflation rates, the 
“Washington consensus” of the early 1990s held that the exchange rate was the 
appropriate nominal anchor provided that fiscal policy was sustainable (Begg (1998) 
and Bruno (1991, 1993)). 
In recent years, the general trend towards full or large capital mobility has 
shifted attention to the implications of capital movements for the choice of exchange 
rate regimes. Fixed exchange rate regimes, when combined with a high degree of 
capital mobility, are exposed to speculative attacks resulting from fundamental policy 
inconsistencies (Krugman (1979), Salant and Henderson (1978)), or self-fulfilling 
expectations that arise in the context of multiple equilibria (Obstfeld (1996)). The 
lesson is that countries should avoid unstable combinations of capital mobility and 
exchange rate fixity. Important factors that reduce the risk of speculative attacks are 
the availability of foreign currency reserves to defend a fixed exchange rate, and the 
consistency of macro economic policies. Sustainable public finances are a key factor 
in this regard. 
 
3.2. Data 
The explanatory variables used in our empirical estimation are chosen to proxy the 
factors discussed in subsection 3.1. Detailed definitions and data sources are given 
in Appendix I. The economic fundamentals include the degree of openness of the 
economy (OPENNESS), geographical concentration of foreign trade (GEOCON), 
commodity concentration of foreign trade (COMCON), per capita real GDP (PCGDP), 
and real GDP.
5 We also consider degrees of openness to the European Union 
(OPENTOEU) and its quadratic term (OPENTOEU
2). This is justified by the 
importance of the EU, not only as the leading market for many transition countries 
but also as the ultimate objective of the transition process for the accession 
countries. The quadratic term allows for the possibility that the marginal desirability of 
a peg declines as countries become very open. Per capita GDP is included as a 
proxy for the level of economic development, and GDP measures the size of the 
economy. These two variables are expressed in logarithms. The last fundamental is 
the ratio of broad money to GDP (MONEY), which approximates the degree of 
financial sector development.
6  
                                                  
5 Except for OPENTOEU, the other proxies for fundamentals are all standard in the literature. 
See, among others, Dreyer (1978), Melvin (1985), Savvides (1990), and Poirson (2001). 
6 See McKinnon (1993) and Hausmann et al. (1999).  8
Three variables are used to proxy considerations of macroeconomic 
stabilization. The first measures the volatility of real exchange rate changes 
(RERVOL), which may call for nominal exchange rate flexibility (Vaubel (1978)). The 
other two variables are the annual rate of consumer price inflation (INFLATION)
7  and 
the cumulative inflation differential (CUMINF) vis-à-vis a country's main trading 
partners. Large but transitory inflation shocks in a given year make a fixed exchange 
rate less sustainable and call for exchange rate adjustments to realign relative prices. 
In contrast, large cumulative inflation differentials indicate persistent problems of 
weak central bank credibility and large domestic nominal shocks, which raise the 
value of using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for monetary policy. 
 
Table 4: Determinants of Exchange Rate Regime Choices 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Determinants      Proxies Preferred  Regimes 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OCA Fundamentals 
High Degree of Economic Openness            OPENNESS    Fixed 
High Trade Concentration: Commodities   COMCON    Flexible 
High Trade Concentration: Geographical   GEOCON     Fixed 
Economic Openness to the EU        OPENTOEU      Fixed 
High Level of Economic Development   PCGDP      Ambiguous 
Large Economic Size           GDP        Flexible 
High Level of Financial Development   MONEY      Flexible 
 
Optimal Stabilization 
Dominance of Real Shocks       RERVOL     Flexible 
Weak Central Bank Credibility       CUMINF     Fixed 
Transitory Domestic Inflation Shocks    INFLATION      Flexible 
 
Risk of Currency Crisis 
Unsustainable Public Finance     FISCAL      Flexible 
Lack of International Reserves     RESERVE    Flexible 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
We select two variables to account for the risk of currency crisis. The first is 
the ratio of non-gold international reserves to broad money (RESERVE), a measure 
of the availability of international liquidity. This should be particularly important for the 
viability and credibility of any rigidly fixed exchange rate regime.
8  The other is the 
ratio of the government fiscal budget balance to GDP (FISCAL), a proxy for the 
soundness of fiscal fundamentals, which plays a crucial role in both first and second 
                                                  
7 In order to dampen the impact of some hyperinflationary episodes on the estimation without 
deleting them from the sample, we follow Gosh et al. (1997) to transform the inflation rate (x) 
by x/(1+x), which measures the depletion of the real value of the currency. 
8 Edwards (1996) and Poirson (2001) find strong evidence that reserve sufficiency increases 
the likelihood for fixed exchange rates being adopted. Meese and Rose (1998) also report  9
generation currency crisis models.
9  Besides these variables, we also include a 
dummy variable for the membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), CISDUMMY. The CIS countries started their transition process later than most 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), their pace of reform is also 
slower than the CEECs. 
In Table 4 we summarize our discussion on the determinants of exchange 
rate regime choices, their proxies used in the empirical estimations, and the 
directions of their influence on regime choices. 
 
4. Empirical  Results 
4.1  A Static Model of Regime Choice 
We describe the choices of exchange rate regimes in our sample using a discrete 
variable, y(i,t), which takes a value of y(i,t)=1 if a fixed regime is selected by country i 
in year t, y(i,t)=2 for an intermediate regime, and y(i,t)=3 for a floating regime. This 
choice is based on the latent variable y(i,t)*, which is a function of the economic 
variables discussed above. A larger value of the latent variable indicates that a more 
flexible regime is desirable for the country and period under consideration. Given the 
discrete nature of regime choices,  we assume that a country chooses a fixed peg, 
y(i,t)=1, if the latent variable is below a certain threshold, y(i,t)*≤c1. Similarly, a 
floating rate regime is chosen, y(i,t)=3, if the latent variable is above a second 
threshold, y(i,t)*>c2, with c2>c1. The intermediate regime is chosen if the latent 
variable falls between the two thresholds. In the empirical estimation, c1 is normalized 
to zero. 
We first consider a static model of exchange rate regime choice. In this model 
we assume that the latent variable y(i,t)*, is a linear function of a vector of 
contemporaneous explanatory variables, Z(i,t), 
 
y(i,t)*= Z(i,t)'β + u(i,t),   i=1,2,…,N,  t=1,2,…,T(i),               (1) 
 
where N is the number of countries, and T(i) denotes the total number of 
observations for country i. The error term, u(i,t), is assumed to be i.i.d with a logistic 
distribution function. This gives rise to an ordered logit model, which explains the 
probability of a country to choose one of the three exchange rate regimes given Z(i,t) 
(Train, 1986). Because the explanatory variables included in Z(i,t) may not be truly 
                                                                                                                                         
some indirect evidence to this effect. Rizzo (1998) and Berger et al. (2000), however, provide 
some counter evidence.  10
exogenous to the regime choices in reality, we instrumentalize all the explanatory 
variables (except for the CISDUMMY) using their own  lagged values as instruments. 
Table 5 reports our estimates. A positive sign associated with a variable 
means that a larger value raises the probability for a more flexible regime being 
chosen. We first report a general specification in column (1) including all variables in 
the estimation, while the specification in column (2) only retains those variables that 
are statistically significant at a level of ten percent. For an easier interpretation of the 
results, Table 5 also reports the marginal effects on the probability of choosing a 
fixed or a flexible rate regime. These marginal effects indicate the increase in the 
probability of adopting a fixed (flexible) exchange rate regime due to a unit-increase 
in the explanatory variable under consideration. For example, the probability of a 
fixed rate regime is Prob(y(i,t)=1) = F(y(i,t)*≤0) = F(-Z(i,t)'β). The marginal effect of 
the j-th element of Z on this probability is -f(-Z(i,t)'β)βj. Here, F denotes the 
distribution function of the error term, and f the density function. Since this effect 
depends on Z(i,t)’β, and is, therefore, different for different realizations of the 
explanatory variables, we evaluate the marginal effects for the hypothetical case of a 
“typical” intermediate regime, i.e., a country for which Z(i,t)’β lies in the middle of the 
interval [0, c2].
10 For example, the estimated marginal effects of “OPENNESS” 
reported in Table 5 indicate that an increase in the ratio of international trade to GDP 
by one percent increases the hypothetical country’s probability of adopting a fixed 
exchange rate regime by 0.34 percent and decreases the probability of adopting a 
flexible rate regime by 0.34 percent. As the probabilities sum to one, the marginal 
effects must sum to zero for all three regimes. For this reason we only report 
marginal effects on the two corner regimes. The marginal effects for the dummy 
variables are computed for the switch from zero to one.    
A first point to note is that the model has quite reasonable explanatory power, 
predicting 72 to 79 percent of all regime choices correctly. A likelihood ratio (LR) test 
for the exclusion of the seven variables not contained in the reduced specification of  
column (2) does not reject this restriction (The Chi-square test statistic is C=6.61 with 
seven degrees of freedom). The lower value of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
also suggests that the more parsimonious model is preferable. 
  The estimates suggest that the fundamentals considered by traditional 
theories of exchange rate regimes affect the choices of the transition economies. The 
                                                                                                                                         
9 For the first generation currency crisis model see Krugman (1979); for the second 
generation model see Obstfeld (1994, 1996). See also the discussion in Begg et al. (1999). 
10 Alternatively, we could evaluate the marginal effects at the sample mean of  Z(i,t)’β. 
However, since the sample mean often lies in the vicinity of the upper threshold, the  11
OPENNESS variable is significant and bears a negative sign, confirming our 
expectation that more open economies are more likely to choose fixed regimes. The 
positive sign on (OPENTOEU
2) suggests that the relation is non-linear. As openness 
to the EU in particular increases, its marginal effect on the probability of choosing a 
fixed rate regime declines. Note that, in our sample, there is no country whose 
openness is large enough to make the squared term dominate the linear one. As 
expected from the OCA perspectives, geographical concentration of trade works in 
favor of fixed rates, while commodity concentration clearly increases the chance for 
flexible regimes. Economic size represented by GDP increases the likelihood of fixed 
regimes, a result which is in contrast to the prediction of traditional theory, but its 
influence is statistically insignificant. Finally, low financial sector development raises 
the probability of a fixed regime being selected. This is as expected. 
In contrast, the variables related to macroeconomic stabilization turn out to be 
insignificant. A likelihood ratio test for joint significance of these variables leads to the 
same conclusion (The Chi-square test statistic is C=1.02 with three degrees of 
freedom.) Similarly, our measure of fiscal performance does not seem to have a 
significant impact on regime choices. However, the availability of international 
reserves is highly significant and correctly signed, indicating that the availability of 
foreign exchange reserves makes the choice of an exchange rate peg more likely. 
Finally, the CIS dummy indicates that these countries have a significantly higher 
tendency to adopt a flexible rate regime than the other transition economies. 
Given the larger unconditional tendency of CIS countries to adopt a floating 
rate regime, we next ask whether these countries are also different in their reactions 
to the other variables contained in the model. To answer this question, we interact all 
explanatory variables with the CIS dummy. Table 6 reports the results of the 
parsimonious specification retaining only those interaction terms which are found to 
be significant at the 10 percent level (The Chi-square statistic for a test of the joint 
significance of the twelve variables excluded from the general specification is C=14.4 
with seven degrees of freedom.) We report the interactive term in boldface, if the 
relevant total impact, i.e., the sum of the coefficients on the respective variable with 
and without the interactive dummy, is significantly different from zero at the 10 
percent level. The table shows that differentiating between the CIS and the remaining 
countries makes a difference for some but not all explanatory variables. The model 
now predicts 80 percent of all observed choices correctly.  
                                                                                                                                         
probability of choosing a fixed regime becomes very low and the marginal effects are 
uninformative.     12
OPENNESS remains negatively significant for the reference group, but its net 
effect works in the direction of a floating rate regime for the CIS countries. There is 
now no separate effect of openness to the EU. Geographical concentration of trade  
works in favor of a floating rate regime among the reference countries, but strongly in 
favor of a fixed rate regime among the CIS countries. The table shows that the 
degree of financial sector development, measured by MONEY, remains positively 
significant only for the CIS countries only. This may reflect the smaller variation of 
this variable across countries in the reference group. 
Turning to macroeconomic stabilization, we find that the cumulated inflation 
differential is now significant with the expected, negative sign. For both groups of 
countries, large cumulated inflation differentials favor the choice of a fixed exchange 
rate as expected. In contrast, a high rate of inflation in a given year favors the choice 
of a more flexible regime in the reference group, but it leads to the choice of a more 
rigid regime among the CIS countries. While the effect in the reference group is as 
expected, the result for the CIS countries may reflect their tendency to peg to the 
Russian rouble in the early 1990s. The volatility of real shocks increases the 
likelihood of a fixed exchange rate in the reference group, which goes against 
conventional models of macroeconomic stabilization. Finally, the availability of 
international reserves remains an important determinant of regime choice among the 
reference countries and the CIS countries. Its effect, however, is smaller among the 
CIS countries than the reference countries. 
 
4.2.  A Dynamic Model of Regime Choice 
The static model embeds the assumption that governments choose an exchange rate 
regime every year without regard to their choices in the preceding year. This 
assumption seems unrealistic, as credibility matters much for exchange rate policies, 
and credibility is gained by remaining in the same regime for some time. That is, a 
country's regime choice in a given year is likely to be correlated with its choice in the 
previous year. In view of this, we extend our model to allow for the assumption that 
past regime choices affect current choices. We do this in two ways. First, by adding 
two dummy variables for the past regimes to model (1). The first dummy, LAGFLEX 
is one, if the previous regime was a flexible one and zero otherwise. The second 
dummy, LAGFIX, is one, if the previous regime had a fixed exchange rate and zero 
otherwise. Second, we interact the explanatory variables relating to macro economic 
stabilization and the risk of currency crisis with these two dummy variables, to allow 
for the possibility that the effect of these variables on the current regime choice 
depends on the previous year’s exchange rate regime. Note that the reference case  13
are all years where the previous regime was an intermediate peg. The resulting 
model is, 
 
y(i,t)*=Z(i,t)'β+Σj=1,2αjgj(i,t-1)+Σj=1,2Z(i,t)'γjgj(i,t-1)  +  u(i,t).     (2) 
 
 Here, g1(i,t-1) is the LAGFLEX dummy, and g2(i,t-1) the LAGFIX dummy.  Thus, the 
reference case is an intermediate regime in the preceding year. The second term on 
the right hand side then measures the effect of the previous year’s exchange rate 
regime on the current choice, while the last term allows for different slope coefficients 
depending on the previous year’s regime. Note that the elements of the vectors γj, 
j=1,2, are set to zero for the variables representing economic fundamentals, because 
these variables do not change much over time. The estimation takes the first regime 
choice as determined by pre-sample history. As before, we estimate an ordered logit 
model. All  explanatory variables are instrumentalized by lagged values.   
The results of model (2) are presented in Table 7. We report only the 
parsimonious specification; the exclusions from the general specification is not 
rejected statistically (The Chi-square test statistic is C=3.6 with eight degrees of 
freedom.) The explanatory power of the model is better than before, with 92 percent 
of correct in-sample prediction. Note, first, that the fundamentals remain statistically 
significant and with the same signs as in the static model. The same is true for the 
reserves variable, which remains significant and favors the choice of a fixed 
exchange rate independently of the preceding exchange rate regime.   
The significant coefficients on the two dummy variables LAGFIX and 
LAGFLEX indicate that there is considerable persistence in the exchange rate regime 
choices. There is now a significantly positive effect of real exchange rate volatility in 
the reference case, indicating that countries choose a more flexible regime in the 
face of large real exchange rate shocks.  While this is as expected, the interactive 
terms indicate that the choices are different when the last period’s regime had a 
floating or a fixed exchange rate. With a floating rate in the previous period, countries 
seem to prefer a more rigid exchange rate regime when real exchange rate volatility 
is currently large, while real exchange rate volatility does not seem to matter if the 
previous year’s regime had a fixed exchange rate.  
Turning to inflation rates, the results are similar. Starting from an intermediate 
regime, high current inflation rates lead countries to adopt a more flexible regime as 
expected. In contrast, the inflation rate does not affect the current regime choice, if 
the previous regime had a floating or a fixed exchange rate. While the former result is  14
compatible with what we expect, the latter indicates that countries stick to a fixed rate 
regime even if its viability is undermined by a high inflation rate.  
Finally, we find no influence of the fiscal balance on regime choices in the 
reference case of a preceding intermediate regime. However, the coefficients on the 
interactive terms with the fiscal balance are significant but with opposite signs. Since 
the balance is positive in the case of a budget surplus, the interpretation is that fiscal 
deficits favor the adoption of intermediate regimes both when the preceding regime 
had a floating and a fixed rate. The former result suggests that, coming from a 
floating regime, countries tighten their exchange rate regime in the presence of large 
deficits in order to impose some discipline on budgetary policies. Coming from a fixed 
rate regime, however, large budget deficits lead to a softening of the peg in order to 




In this paper, we present an empirical study of the choice of exchange rate 
regimes for the group of 25 transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the CIS. We have approached this analysis from three different angles: traditional 
optimum currency area theory, macroeconomic stabilization, and concerns about 
currency crisis and the viability of exchange rate policies. 
The empirical results indicate that exchange rate regime choices are largely 
consistent with the predictions of international macroeconomics during the period 
under consideration. This is interesting given the fact that the countries included in 
our sample only started to participate in international trade and capital markets when 
they emerged from socialism a decade ago.  
The results suggest that countries with geographically concentrated foreign 
trade or with diversified product structure are more likely to adopt fixed exchange rate 
regimes. Economic openness also works in the same direction. A more advanced 
financial system favors the choice of flexible exchange rates, as it permits the 
development of more sophisticated instruments for the conduct of monetary policy. 
These arguments suggest that the reasoning of optimum currency-area literature 
provides considerable guidance for the choice of exchange rate regimes. The only 
factor which is not consistent with this is economic size; we find that larger countries 
in our sample are more likely to adopt a fixed exchange rate regime.    
 Among the variables related to macroeconomic stabilization, current inflation 
as well as cumulative inflation differentials play important roles in the regime choice. 
High current inflation rates make fixed exchange rate regimes more difficult to  15
sustain. As expected, they increase the probability of adopting more  flexible 
regimes. In contrast, large cumulative inflation differentials vis-à-vis a country’s main 
trading partners signal problems of weak central bank credibility and lead to more 
stable exchange rates, probably by adopting exchange-rate based disinflation 
programs. Among the crisis variables the availability of foreign exchange reserves 
strongly favors fixed regimes, as large reserves can enhance the sustainability of 
such regimes. There are differences between the non-CIS and the CIS countries in 
choosing the exchange rate regimes. Overall, the CIS countries have shown a 
stronger preference for flexible exchange rate regimes than the Central and East 
European countries. This may reflect the desire of the latter to tie themselves more 
strongly to the European Union, to whose currency they peg in practice. The CIS 
countries seem to pay less attention to reserve adequacy in their regime selection 
than the non-CIS countries. 
Our dynamic choice model shows that past regime choices strongly influence 
current decisions, not only directly through the regime persistency, but also indirectly 
via the interaction with real exchange rate volatility, inflation rates, inflation 
differentials, and fiscal deficits. The dynamic model suggests that current regime 
choices are more consistent with the predictions of international macro economics 
when countries had adopted an intermediate or a flexible exchange rate regime in 
the preceding period. Specifically, real exchange rate volatility and inflation rates 
have no significant impact on the current regime choice, if the preceding regime had 
a fixed exchange rate. This may reflect a tendency for countries to become hard-
nosed about pegging their exchange rates rigidly even under unfavorable conditions, 
perhaps in an attempt to invest in credibility. In contrast, countries tend to loosen 
their exchange rate regimes in the presence of large fiscal deficits if the previous 
regime had a rigidly fixed exchange rate. This indicates an awareness of the risk of 
speculative attacks when fiscal and monetary policies are inconsistent with each 
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Table 5: Static Ordered Choice Model 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(1)       (2)         Marginal Effects
1 
Variable     Coeff.    S.E.  Coeff.    S.E.    FIX          FLEX 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
OPENNESS    -3.14**   1.30     -1.60*    0.86         0.34          -0.34 
OPENTOEU    -7.06       8.51                
OPENTOEU
2    17.79*    9.35       6.56***    2.33        -1.41        1.41 
GEOCON      -13.64*    8.23    -17.75***     5.98         3.82    -3.82 
COMCON       14.22***      5.09     13.70***      4.47        -2.95    2.95 
PCGDP         -0.11       0.67                 
GDP           -0.63       0.42         
MONEY          3.43*     1.85      1.26       1.27        -0.27    0.27 
 
RERVOL        -0.39       1.02     
INFLATION       1.40        1.42     
CUMINF         -0.10       0.24     
 
RESERVE      -3.74***      0.93     -2.90***      0.73         0.62   -0.62 
FISCAL          8.63             11.76    
 
CISDUMMY     5.59***      1.47      5.22***      1.04        -0.31    0.68 
CONSTANT     3.78        5.58      3.29       3.66     
THRESHOLD   1.61***      0.29      1.57***      0.28    
 
No. of Obs.   140            140     
Log-likelihood   -85.4                 -88.7  
AIC
2     111.4               97.7  
Correctly  
Predicted (%)   72.1              78.6    
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: Statistics with *, **, or *** are significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
[1] Marginal effects based on specification (2) and evaluated at the midpoint between 
the two thresholds, except for CISDUMMY, whose marginal effects are computed as 
the changes in the relevant probabilities when the dummy switches from zero to 
unity. FIX and FLEX stand for fixed and flexible regimes, respectively. 
[2] Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) defined by AIC=K-l, where K is the number of 
parameters and l the log-likelihood of the model. See Amemiya (1981)  19
Table 6: Static Ordered Choice Model with Interactive Dummy 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(3)
a             Marginal Effects
1 
Variables       Coeff.    S.E.       FIX                 FLEX 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
OPENNESS      -11.36***     2.79     2.02    -2.02 
GEOCON      30.27*        15.90     -5.37        5.37 
COMCON       20.56***      6.65       -3.65         3.65 
PCGDP             5.05***       1.18       -0.90        0.90 
GDP          -2.03***          0.58       0.36           -0.36 
OPENNESS*CIS     16.32***      3.96       -2.90         2.90 
GEOCON*CIS    -98.85***     26.83     17.54      -17.54   
MONEY*CIS      61.66***      21.90     -10.94        10.94 
 
RERVOL        -2.62**       1.27       0.46           -0.46 
INFLATION         15.67***      3.47       -2.78               2.78 
CUMINF        -1.41***         0.37       0.25           -0.25 
INFLATION*CIS   -20.40***     4.41       3.62           -3.62 
 
RESERVE      -12.10***     2.69        2.15          -2.15 
RESERVE*CIS      7.19***       2.40       -1.28        1.28 
 
CISDUMMY       52.10***      14.64     -0.23        0.77 
CONSTANT      -14.72*      7.77   
THRESHOLD        2.41***       0.44   
 
No. of Obs.       140     
Log-likelihood   -61.1  
AIC        78.1  
Correct pred. (%)     80.0    
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: Statistics with *, **, or *** are significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
[a] Coefficients in bold are significant at 10% or higher levels if summed with the 
non-interactive counterparts. 
[1] Marginal effects based on specification (3) and evaluated at the midpoint between 
two thresholds, except for CISDUMMY, whose marginal effects are computed as the 
changes in the relevant probabilities when the dummy switches from zero to unity. 
FIX and FLEX stand for fixed and flexible regimes, respectively. 
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Table 7: Dynamic Ordered Choice Model 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    (4)            Marginal Effects
1 
Variables           Coeff.    S.E.      FIX    FLEX 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
OPENNESS           -24.11***       8.57      0.41           -0.41 
COMCON             39.17*      21.04     -0.66          0.66 
PCGDP                 16.34***         5.90     -0.28         0.28 
GDP                   -5.89***         2.05      0.10           -0.10 
OPENNESS*CIS           43.61***      13.85     -0.74         0.74 
GEOCON*CIS      -312.60***    102.5     5.27           -5.27 
MONEY*CIS           248.31***        88.83    -4.19         4.19 
INFLATION*CIS        -32.91**      12.73     0.56           -0.56 
RESERVE*CIS          23.70**   10.63    -0.40     0.40 
 
RERVOL             19.50*   10.25    -0.33     0.33 
RERVOL*LAGFLEX       -30.00**   13.48     0.51     -0.51 
RERVOL*LAGFIX        -28.31**    12.67    0.48     -0.48 
 
INFLATION             34.51**      13.30    -0.58          0.58 
INFLATION*LAGFLEX      -22.57**     9.28     0.38     -0.38 
INFLATION*LAGFIX        -49.80***    17.54    0.84     -0.84 
 
CUMINF              -2.04*           1.06    0.03         -0.03 
CUMINF*LAGFLEX          -8.43***         2.77    0.14          -0.14 
CUMINF*LAGFIX         -2.14**      1.08    0.04    -0.04 
 
RESERVE          -37.29***        13.74     0.63           -0.63 
 
FISCAL*LAGFLEX       231.15***       81.75   -3.90         3.90 
FISCAL*LAGFIX      -115.63**    51.55    1.95     -1.95 
 
LAGFLEX             30.15***       10.14    -0.02       0.98 
LAGFIX              -7.55**         3.73     0.95          -0.02 
CISDUMMY         159.68***       52.99    -0.02        0.98 
THRESHOLD                 8.10***         2.51  
 
No. of Obs.          140     
Log-likelihood           -22.4  
AIC           48.4  
Correct pred. (%)      92.1    
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: Statistics with *, **, or *** are significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
 [1] Marginal efects based on specification (4) and evaluated at the midpoint between 
the two thresholds, except for CISDUMMY, LAGFLEX, and LAGFIX, whose marginal 
effects are computed as the changes in the relevant probabilities when the dummy 
switches from zero to unity. FIX and FLEX stand for fixed and flexible regimes, 
respectively.  21
Appendix I: Definition of Variables and Sources of 
Data 
CISDUMMY: Dummy for the member countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, including Armenia, Azebaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan. 
 
COMCON: Commodity concentration of foreign trade, measured by the Gini-
Hirschman coefficient defined below. Commodities are first defined at the one-digit 
SITC level (0-9) to create ten broad groups and then reclassified into seven main 
commodity categories. Denote exports of commodity i from country j by Xij and 
country j's total export by Xj, the Gini-Hirschman coefficient for country j, Cj, is defined 
as Cj= √{∑i(Xij/Xj)
2}. Data on commodity trade are from International Trade Center. 
 
CUMINF: Cumulative differentials in annual consumer price inflation rates vis-à-vis 
main trading partners. A positive entry denotes a cumulative higher inflation than a 
weighted average of the main trading partners. The starting year is 1990. The five 
largest trading partners are involved in the calculation, with weights equal to their 
respective trade shares. Data source is IMF,  International Financial Statistics 
(various issues). 
 
FISCAL: General government budget balance, normalized by GDP. A positive 
(negative) entry denotes a surplus (deficit). Data source is IMF, International 
Financial Statistics (various issues), and EBRD, Transition Report (1999). 
 
GDP: Gross domestic products in current prices, in billions of US dollars and then in 
logarithms. Data are from IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2000. 
 
GEOCON: Geographic concentration of foreign trade, measured by the Gini-
Hirschman coefficient denoted by Cj for country j. Denote country j's total bilateral 
trade with country I by Xij, and country j's total trade by Xj, then Cj= √{∑i(Xij/Xj)
2}. Only 
five largest trade partners are considered for the calculation of this coefficient since 
they usually account for more than two-thirds of the foreign trade in the countries in 
question. Data source is IMF,  Direction of Trade Statistics (various issues). 
 
INFLATION: Change in the consumer prices, annual average, transformed using the 
formula x* = x/(1+x). Data source is IMF,  International Financial Statistics (various 
issues). 
 
MONEY: Broad money, normalized by GDP. Broad money is the sum of „money” and 
„quasi-money”. Data source is IMF,  International Financial Statistics (various 
issues). 
 
OPENNESS: Degree of openness to foreign economies, measured by the ratio of 
total trade volume to GDP. Total trade volume is the sum of goods export (f.o.b.) and 
goods import (c.i.f.). Trade data are from IMF,  Direction of Trade Statistics (various 
issues). GDP data are from IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 
2000. 
 
OPENTOEU: Degree of openness to the EU, measured by the share of trade with 
the EU in total trade. Data source is IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (various 
issues). 
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PCGDP: Per capita GDP, in thousands of US dollars and then in logarithms. Data 
are from IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2000. 
 
RERVOL: Volatility of the real exchange rate, measured by the standard deviation in 
the monthly change of the real effective exchange rate. The change of the real 
effective exchange rate is the weighted average of changes of five bilateral effective 
exchange rates vis-à-vis five largest trade partners. The weights are their respective 
trade shares. Both home and foreign consumer price inflation rates are used in the 
calculation. Data sources are IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues), 
and UN Economic Council for Europe Database provided by Charles Wyplosz. 
 
RESERVE: Ratio of non-gold international reserves to broad money. Data sources 
are IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues), Country Report (various 
issues), and EBRD,  Transition Report (1999).  23
 
 
Appendix II: Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition 
Countries 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1990  1991    1992    1993    1994    1995    1996    1997    1998  1999 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
EU Accession Candidates: Central and Eastern European Countries 
 
Bulgaria                  3 8 8 8 8 8 8 2 2 2 
Czech  Rep.          3 3 3 3 3 3 4 7 7 7 
Hungary          3  3  3  3  3  6  6  6  6  6 
Poland            3  5  5  5  5  6  6  6  6  6 
Romania           3  7  8  8  8  8  8  8  7  7 
Slovak  Rep.        3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 7 7 
Slovenia          na  (7)  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
 
EU Accession Candidates: Baltics 
Estonia           na  na  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Latvia            na  na  (8)  (8)  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Lithuania         na  na  (8)  (8)  2  2  2  2  2  2 
 
Other Central and Eastern European Countries 
Albania           3  3  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8 
Croatia           na  na  3  8  4  4  4  4  4  7 
Macedonia            na  na  8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Armenia         na  na  (3)  (8)  8  8  8  8  8  8 
Azerbaijan       na  na  (3)  (3)  8  8  8  8  7  7 
Belarus           na  na  (3)  (3)  (7)  7  4  7  7  7 
Georgia           na  na  (3)  (8)  7  7  7  3  8  8 
Kazakhstan          na  na  (3)  (8)  8 8 8 7 7 8 
Kyrgyz  Rep.      na  na  (3)  (8)  8 7 7 7 7 7 
Moldova          na  na  (3)  (8)  8  8  8  8  8  8 
Russia            na  na  (3)  (8)  8  4  6  6  7  8 
Tajikistan        na  na  na  (3)  (3)  8  8  8  7  7 
Turkmenistan  na  na  (3)  (3)  3 7 7 3 3 3 
Ukraine           na  na  (3)  (8)  8  7  7  4  4  7 
Uzbekistan      na  na  (3)  (3)  (8)  7  7  7  7  7 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: End-year observations. Codes in parentheses refer to the periods when the 
newly-introduced national currencies have not yet assumed the status as the sole 
legal tender. The meanings of the codes are: na=not available, 1=currency union (no 
separate legal tender), 2=currency board arrangements, 3=conventionally fixed pegs 
(adjustable pegs, de facto pegs), 4=horizontal bands, 5=crawling pegs, 6=crawling 
bands, 7=managed floating without preannounced path for the exchange rate, 
8=independent floating. 2008
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